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Host; identity; Twitter; responsibility; illegal 
content; author; Data Protection Law; 
communication; data; injunction; Article 145 of 
the CPC; French law; enforcement; jurisdiction
We, President
After hearing the parties or their counsel appearing,
Given the assignment issued on 29 November 2012 
against the company Twitter Inc., at the request of Union 
des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF) and J’accuse! … action 
internationale pour la justice (AIPJ) who ask:
- visa section II-6 of the Act of 21 June 2004 on 
confidence in the digital economy and the alternative 
of article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
➢ to order the company Twitter Inc. to provide them 
with the data listed in the decree 2011-219 of 25 
February 2011 likely to enable the identification of any 
person who has contributed to the creation of clearly 
illegal tweets, in accordance with the notification of 23 
October 2012,
- visa section 6-I.8 of the Law of 21 June 2004 on 
confidence in the digital economy and alternative 
articles 808 and/or 809 paragraph 1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure,
➢ to order the company Twitter Inc. to implement in 
the context of the French platform service Twitter Inc. 
a platform easily accessible and visible to any person 
wishing to bring knowledge of illegal content falling 
within the scope of defending crimes against humanity 
and incitement to racial hatred,
- to match these injunctions of a fine of €10,000 per day 
of delay and infringement of the delivery of the binding 
order of minutes,
- order the defendant to pay each of the applicants the 
sum of €1,500 under article 700 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure,
Given the assignment issued on 20 December 2012, the 
company Twitter France, at the request of Union des 
Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF) and J’accuse! … action 
internationale pour la justice (AIPJ), who demand:
- visa section 6-I.8 of the Law of 21 June 2004 on 
confidence in the digital economy and alternative 
articles 808 and/or 809 paragraph 1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure:
➢ To order the company Twitter France, jointly with the 
company Twitter Inc. to implement in the context of the 
French platform service Twitter Inc. a platform easily 
accessible and readable for anyone wishing to bring 
knowledge of illegal content falling within the scope of 
the apology of crimes against humanity and incitement 
to racial hatred,
- to impose the injunction of a fine of €10,000 per day 
of delay and infringement of the delivery of the binding 
order on minute,
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- to order the defendant to pay each of the applicants 
the sum of €1,500 under article 700 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure,
Considering the submissions of the hearing on 8 January 
2013 by the Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF) and 
J’accuse! … action internationale pour la justice (AIPJ) that 
maintain their original claims and modify the request call, 
requesting that it does not begin until the eighth day after 
service of the order,
Given the voluntary intervention submissions filed 
at the hearing on 8 January 2013 by Association SOS 
Racisme-Touche pas a mon pote who has the same 
demands as those contained in the two assignments,
Given the voluntary intervention submissions filed 
at the hearing on 8 January 2013 by the Le Mouvement 
Contre Le Racisme et pour L’Amitié Entre Les Peuples 
(MRAP), which has the same demands as those 
contained in the conclusions of the Association l’UEJF and 
J’ACCUSE, requesting also the credentials of anyone who 
contributed data to the creation of ‘simonfilsestgay’ and 
‘simafilleramèneunnoir’ and claiming of each defendant 
the sum of €1,000,
Given the voluntary intervention submissions filed at 
the hearing on 8 January 2013 by the l’association La ligue 
contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme (LICRA) for view:
- to order that the companies Twitter Inc. and Twitter 
France provide, under penalty, the data listed in the 
decree 2011-219 of 25 February 2011 likely to enable 
the identification of any person who has contributed to 
the creation of clearly illegal tweets,
- to order that the companies Twitter Inc. and Twitter 
France set up in the framework of the French version 
of the electronic communications service they publish 
online at https//twitter.com/ and their applications 
available on smartphone, and any easily accessible 
and visible platform allowing anyone to inform them of 
illegal content falling within the scope of the apology 
of crimes against humanity and incitement to racial 
hatred,
- to match this last injunction of a fine of €10,000 per 
day of delay and infringement of the delivery of the 
binding order of minutes,
- to convict defendants jointly and severally, to pay the 
sum of €1,500 under article 700 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure,
Considering the submissions filed at the hearing on 8 
January 2013 by the companies Twitter Inc. and Twitter 
France ask us:
- not to grant the demands formulated against Twitter 
France,
- to note that French law in this case does not apply, it 
is a substantive issue that is beyond the judicial power 
of the court,
- to act that the company Twitter Inc. is committed to 
provide the data for the identification of the authors of 
tweets listed in the summons exclusively in connection 
with an international rogatory commission (mutual 
legal assistance treaty request) respecting the 
provisions of the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 
ratified by France and the United States,
- or give notice it agrees to provide the credentials of 
the author of the tweets in question in the event that 
this measure is deemed necessary, provided that the 
applicants proceed to the enforcement of the French 
court decision through the jurisdiction of California 
under the law of America,
- to note that the company Twitter is committed within 
48 hours of the hearing on 8 January to providing a 
French version of the notification procedure available 
at https//support.twitter.com/forms/abusiveuser,
- to dismiss the plaintiffs and intervening voluntary 
associations of their other requests,
Given the oral submissions by counsel for the parties 
at the hearing on 8 January 2013, after which they were 
informed that this decision would be made on 24 January 
2013 at 14 hours per provision at the Registry of the Court,
The facts
The company Twitter Inc. is an American company 
founded in March 2006, with its headquarters in San 
Francisco, California, and operates a platform for social 
networking and micro-blogging on the internet with over 
500 million users. This service allows registered members 
to post short messages called ‘tweets’ to follow the 
publications of other micro-bloggers and to participate in 
discussions.
The plaintiffs argue that their vigilant associations were 
clearly alerted to various illicit tweets grouped under the 
hashtag # un bon juif (‘a good jew’) then # un juif mort (‘a 
dead jew’) with violently anti-Semitic messages, contrary 
to French public order.
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By means of registered mail with a return receipt dated 
23 October 2012, their lawyer brought to the attention 
of the company Twitter Inc. pursuant to section 63 of the 
act of 21 June 2004 on confidence in the digital economy, 
various tweets that may characterize racial insult and 
public offences of incitement to discrimination, hatred 
or violence, national, racial or religious, and racial 
defamation in public, together with a formal notice to act 
promptly to remove clearly illegal content. The company 
Twitter Inc. has complied with this notice.
Meanwhile, the company Twitter France SAS was 
created and registered on 19 November 2012.
On the procedure
For the proper administration of justice and by reason 
of their interdependence, it is appropriate to order the 
junction of assignments undertaken by 29 November and 
20 December 2012.
Article 48-1 of the law of 29 July 1881 on the freedom 
of the press provides amongst other things that ‘any 
association lawfully registered for at least five years 
from the date of the incident, proposing, through its 
statutes, [...] combating racism and assisting victims 
of discrimination based on racial or religious, national, 
ethnic origin, may exercise the rights granted to the civil 
party in respect of the offences provided for in articles 24 
(paragraph 8), 32 (paragraph 2) and 33 (paragraph 3) of 
this Act [...].’
Similarly, the following article has the same rights 
including statutory organizations proposing to defend the 
moral interests and honour of the deportees regarding the 
crime of advocating crimes against humanity.
The main plaintiff associations and voluntary caregivers 
meet these conditions, they have an incentive to act and 
their actions are admissible in accordance with article 31 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is not disputed by 
the defence.
The communication data would enable the 
identification of the authors of tweets
As such, the plaintiffs seek the communication of the data 
listed by decree 2011-219 of 25 February 2011 on the basis 
of article 641 of the Law of 21 June 2004 on confidence in 
the digital economy and, alternatively, section 145 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure.
They argue in particular:
- the American company Twitter Inc. cannot avoid 
compliance with the enforcement of the law and 
security applicable to the activity that unfolds in 
France, namely the exploitation of the French version 
of the online communication service that it publishes 
and incidental storage of messages delivered by the 
recipients of these services,
- the company is established in France in both the 
legal and economic sense because of the nature of its 
business and the advertising revenue it provides, it 
also has an establishment in the French territory by its 
subsidiary Twitter France,
- the law of 21 June 2004 on confidence in the digital 
economy in articles 6.I.7, 6.I.8 and 6.2 is a law relating 
to public policy, safety and security as a protector of 
civil liberties, and the provisions invoked are criminally 
punishable,
- the French platform Twitter is intended exclusively for 
the French public, as evidenced by the language used 
and the choice of topics,
- that the information sought is essential to the 
prosecution and to the associations in question intends 
to take against the perpetrators of tweets before the 
French courts,
- Twitter Inc. uses tangible and intangible processing 
located on French territory namely its French 
subsidiary, the PC users of its services and software 
therein situated, and to organize the collection and 
transfer of user data.
For their part, the defendants expose and justify:
- The company Twitter Inc. is only responsible for 
the operation of the service Twitter from a legal and 
technical point of view, as it is stated in its terms 
and conditions it is the sole owner of the domain 
names, and the hosted content is stored on servers 
belonging to them located in the United States and is 
the recipient authorized to receive reports of illegal 
content,
- the company has only created Twitter France to play 
a simple role of commercial agency in the context of 
a marketing mission, and the plaintiffs do not show 
otherwise.
The company Twitter Inc. denies that it is subject to an 
obligation to retain data under French law, namely article 
6-II of the Law of 21 June 2004 on confidence in the 
digital economy Implementing Decree No. 2011-219 of 25 
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February 2011.
Indeed, it rightly points out that article 4 of the 
Decree provides that ‘the retention of data referred 
to in article 1 shall be subject to the requirements of 
the law of 6 January 1978 referred to above, including 
the requirements set out in Article 34, for information 
security’ and that article 2 of Law No. 78-12 of 6 January 
1978 relating to computers, files and freedoms accurate 
are subject to this law treatments ‘whose controller is 
established on the French territory’ or ‘uses processing 
means located on French territory.’ The company also 
points out that according to the ‘Article 29 Working 
Group’ which brings together the European data 
protection authorities, the mere presence on the French 
territory of a commercial purpose is not enough to make 
European laws on data protection applicable. It observes 
that the data are collected and maintained under 
California law and that it cannot guarantee to be retained 
beyond what is required by law or have maintained all the 
data provided by the decree of 25 February 2011.
In response to the opposing argument, it contends that 
the provisions of the Law of 21 June 2004 on confidence in 
the digital economy can be described as police law within 
the meaning of article 3 of the Civil Code. In order to retain 
this qualification, it should consider the application of the 
French law as binding without any doubt to safeguard the 
national socio-economic organization; however the mere 
fact that non-compliance with certain of its provisions 
is criminally sanctioned does not allow it to retain the 
imperative character of the law’s application; furthermore 
it is not seriously argued that without the application of 
French law, no retention of data would be provided by the 
law of the foreign state.
In addition, the plaintiffs point out that, under article 5 
of the Data Protection Act as amended and article 45 of 
Directive 95/46 EC on the protection of data, the person 
responsible remains subject to the French law as long 
as that person uses processing means located on the 
French territory (excluding those that are not used only 
for transit) and the ‘Article 29 Working Group’ considers 
processing means such as personal computers, terminals, 
servers, but also the use of ‘cookies’ and similar software.
However, the defendants respond, without being 
effectively contradicted in this regard – that Twitter never 
use ‘cookies’ to collect and store user identification data 
and that they are stored on servers in the United States.
Finally, the plaintiffs suggest that the European 
Commission made public on 25 January 2012 a proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council will apply ‘to the treatment of personal data 
belonging to persons concerned who are residing in the 
territory of Union by a controller who is not established in 
the Union’, which tends to confirm that such an extension 
is not yet part of the law.
Ultimately, the plaintiff associations do not 
demonstrate that the company Twitter Inc. is based in 
France and used for the data retention issue, material or 
human, society France Twitter, or any other entity located 
in the French territory otherwise than for transit purposes.
Given all these factors, it does not appear with the 
evidence required for interim measures under article 6-II 
of the Law of 21 June 2004 on confidence in the digital 
economy and the Decree No. 211-219 of 25 February 2011 
are applicable in this case.
It is therefore necessary to consider the first application 
on the basis of the alternative, that is article 145 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, which states that ‘If there is a 
legitimate reason to preserve or to establish, before any 
legal process, the evidence of the facts upon which the 
resolution of the dispute depends, legally permissible 
preparatory inquiries may be ordered at the request of 
any interested party, by way of a petition or by way of 
a summary procedure’, as observed in an international 
dispute, the implementation of such measures is subject 
to French law.
It will be noted in this regard that:
- the Twitter Rules states that ‘International users 
agree to comply with all local laws regarding online 
conduct and acceptable content’;
- Users whose identification is sought are amenable 
to French criminal law in accordance with article 113-2 
of the Criminal Code, the offence is ‘deemed to be 
committed on the territory of the Republic since one of 
its constituent facts took place on the territory’;
- Twitter does not challenge the jurisdiction of the 
French court or the illegality of messages, when it was 
immediately granted the request for their removal;
- the company Twitter Inc. is registered under under 
California law, the conditions of service stating that 
‘if Twister is contacted by law enforcement agencies, 
we can work with them and offer help to their 
investigation.’
Thus, there is a legitimate reason for the organizations 
involved to obtain communication data identifying the 
perpetrators of the tweets held by the company Twitter 
Inc.
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Their request will be granted on the basis of article 145 
of the Code of Civil Procedure without it being necessary 
to agree the requirement of the company Twitter Inc. 
to serve international letters rogatory or procedure of 
enforcement of the French decision, the plaintiffs having 
rightly observed that the defendants have no right to 
pre-judge their strategy in the event of a breach of this 
decision.
However, the additional request by the MRAP will 
not be granted in relation to the ‘simonfilsestgay’ 
hashtags – this association is not entitled to act to combat 
homophobia – and ‘simafilleramèneunnoir’ since the 
disputed posts are not sufficiently specific.
On the establishment of a platform 
signaling manifestly illegal content
On the basis of article 6.I.8 of the Law of 21 June 2004 
on confidence in the digital economy, and alternatively, 
articles 508 and/or 809 paragraph 1 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, it is requested that the company Twitter 
Inc. ., jointly with the company Twitter France, set up in 
the French service platform Twitter Inc. a device easily 
accessible and visible to any person to bring to the 
knowledge of illegal content falling within the scope of 
the apology crimes against humanity and incitement to 
racial hatred.
The company Twitter Inc. said that this request is moot 
because it already has available to users a procedure for 
reporting illegal content.
However, it is rightly replicated by the plaintiffs that the 
form in question was not available in the French language 
in any case on the eve of the hearing. They emphasize 
that it is not easily accessible and visible, it is necessary 
to click successively on four links, and unlike all the 
competitors or comparable services, including Facebook, 
there is no tab available from the active page, and cannot 
bring to the attention of Twitter manifestly illegal content.
A French version of the form was produced on 8 January 
2013, the company is nevertheless ordered to establish a 
simpler and more complete system. However, no penalty 
is ordered in this matter since the company Twitter Inc. 
does not dispute that it must establish such a device and 
has already begun initiatives in direction.
Finally, the sum of €1,000 is awarded to each of the 
main plaintiff associations and €500 for each volunteer 
worker under article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
For these reasons 
Acting publicly and contradictory in first instance,
We order the junction of assignments undertaken by 29 
November and 20 December 2012,
Receive the voluntary intervention from the Association 
SOS Racisme-Touche pas a mon pote, Le Mouvement 
Contre Le Racisme et pour L’Amitié Entre Les Peuples 
(MRAP) and La Ligue Internationale Contre Le Racisme et 
L’Antisémitisme (LICRA),
We order the company Twitter Inc. to communicate with 
the five associations because the data in its possession is 
likely to enable the identification of any person who has 
contributed to the creation of clearly illegal tweets,
Say that communication must take place within fifteen 
days of service of this decision, and under penalty of 
€1,000 per day of delay after such period,
We reserve the liquidation of the penalty,
As needed if it has not yet finalized, ordain the company 
Twitter Inc. to implement in the context of the French 
service platform Twitter Inc. a device that is easily 
accessible and visible to any person bringing knowledge 
of illegal content, including falling within the scope of the 
apology of crimes against humanity and incitement to 
racial hatred,
Order the company Twitter Inc., to pay each of the two 
main plaintiffs the sum of €1,000 and the €500 to each of 
the three plaintiffs who’s voluntary intervention has been 
received, under article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Surplus reject requests of the parties,
Order the company Twitter Inc. to pay costs.
Made in Paris on 24 January 2013
The President Anne-Marie Anne-Marie Sauteraud
The assistant Estelle Lafaye
With thanks to Frédérique Dalle and François Delerue for 
making observations on this translation.
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The French Twitter Case: a difficult 
equilibrium between freedom of expression 
and its limits
By François Delerue1 
The French Twitter case shows the difficulties 
experienced by courts, national authorities and 
companies, in relation to an international activity, and 
to find an equilibrium between freedom of expression 
and its limits, notably in the respect of public order. 
Moreover, it also shows that in a significant number 
of cases on the Internet, the application of the French 
law depends on the goodwill of the companies or the 
authorities of a foreign state.
In the autumn of 2012, there was a wave of tweets on 
Twitter in French with racist content using the hashtags2 
#unbonjuif [a good Jew] or #unjuifmort [a dead Jew]. The 
tweets were contrary to the French public order.
On the 23 October 2012, a number of French 
associations acting against racism requested Twitter to 
remove the tweets. The associations based their action 
on the provisions of article 6.I.7 of the act of 21 June 2004 
on confidence in the digital economy (LCEN).3 Indeed, 
according to article 6.I.2 of LCEN, providers are not civilly 
liable for the content they host if they are not aware of the 
wrongfulness of this content; moreover, article 6.I.7, used 
by the associations, specifies that there is not a general 
obligation on the provider to monitor the content it hosts, 
but it has a duty as follows:
‘[…] Compte tenu de l’intérêt général attaché à 
la répression de l’apologie des crimes contre 
l’humanité, de l’incitation à la haine raciale ainsi 
que de la pornographie enfantine […] elles doivent 
mettre en place un dispositif facilement accessible et 
visible permettant à toute personne de porter à leur 
connaissance ce type de données. Elles ont également 
l’obligation, d’une part, d’informer promptement les 
autorités publiques compétentes de toutes activités 
illicites mentionnées à l’alinéa précédent qui leur 
seraient signalées et qu’exerceraient les destinataires 
de leurs services, et, d’autre part, de rendre publics 
les moyens qu’elles consacrent à la lutte contre ces 
activités illicites.’
‘[…] Given the general interest attached to the 
repression of the apology of crimes against humanity, 
incitement to racial hatred and child pornography […] 
they must establish an easily accessible and visible 
device for anyone to draw their attention to this type of 
data. They also have an obligation, on the one hand, to 
promptly inform the competent public authorities of all 
illegal activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph 
which are reported to them and performed by the users 
of their services, and, on the other hand to render 
public how they spend the fight against these illegal 
activities.’
By their letter, the associations rendered Twitter aware of 
the wrongfulness of the tweets, and so Twitter had to take 
action against them; if not, Twitter would be liable for the 
content of the tweets. The associations decided to seize 
the court of the matter due to the lack of an answer and 
any action from Twitter, although Twitter eventually made 
the tweets inaccessible.
The first instance procedure
On 29 November 2012, two French associations, the 
Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF) [French Jewish 
Students Union] and the Association J’accuse – action 
internationale pour la justice, decided to take legal 
action against Twitter in France.4 In addition, their action 
was accompanied by voluntary interventions from three 
others associations, Le Mouvement Contre Le Racisme et 
pour L’Amitié Entre Les Peuples (MRAP), La ligue contre 
le racisme et l’antisémitisme (LICRA) and Association 
SOS Racisme-Touche pas a mon pote. On 20 December 
2012, the same associations took another legal action, 
for the same reasons, against the newly created French 
subsidiary of Twitter, Twitter France.5 The judge decided 
to join both cases, and so they will be considered 
together.
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1 This commentary is based on a previous blog 
post of the SURVEILLE FP7 project (http://
www.surveille.eu). I thank Stephen Mason 
for his useful comments; of course, all errors 
are that of the author. 
2 In French, the decision was made to translate 
‘hashtag’ by ‘mot-dièse’; see: ‘Vocabulaire 
des télécommunications et de l’informatique 
(NOR: CTNX1242797K)’, Journal Officiel 
de la République française, 19, 23 January 
2013, 1515 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichTexte.do;jsessionid=31D2C7AB2F1C53
7B51631A55E96447C3.tpdjo09v_3?cidTexte
=JORFTEXT000026972451&dateTexte=&old
Action=rechJO&categorieLien=id.
3 Loi n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 loi pour la 
confiance dans l’économie numérique.
4 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 
Ordonnance de référé, 24 janv. 2013, n° 
13/50262, n° 13/50276, UEJF et a. c/ Twitter 
Inc. et Sté Twitter France.
5 The company Twitter France was created on 
the 19 November 2012 and is incorporated 
in France (789305596 R.C.S. PARIS); 
see https://www.infogreffe.fr/societes/
entreprise-societe/789305596-twitter-france-
sas-750112B228780000.html.
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6 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la 
presse. 
7 Emmanuel Derieux, ‘Diffusion de 
messages racistes sur Twitter: Obligations 
de l’hébergeur’, Revue Lamy droit de 
l’immatériel, 90 (February 2013), 27-32, 28.
8 Décret n° 2011-219 du 25 février 2011 relatif 
à la conservation et à la communication 
des données permettant d’identifier toute 
personne ayant contribué à la création d’un 
contenu mis en ligne.
9 Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à 
l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés.
Before going further, it is important to note that in France, 
article 48-1 of the law of 29 of July 1881 on the freedom 
of the press,6 as noted in the case, states that French 
associations may exercise rights for different kind of 
offence:
‘combattre le racisme ou d’assister les victimes de 
discrimination fondée sur leur origine nationale, 
ethnique, raciale ou religieuse, peut exercer les droits 
reconnus à la partie civile’
‘combating racism and assisting victims of 
discrimination based on racial or religious, national, 
ethnic origin, may exercise the rights granted to the 
civil party’
This explains why, in this case, some associations took 
legal action against Twitter. Moreover, it should be added 
that Twitter did not contest the competence of the plaintiff 
associations.
The associations asked primarily for two things: firstly, 
‘to order the company Twitter Inc. to provide them with 
the data listed in the decree 2011-219 of 25 February 
2011 likely to enable the identification of any person who 
has contributed to the creation of clearly illegal tweets 
[…]’ and secondly, ‘to order the company Twitter Inc. to 
implement in the context of the French platform service 
Twitter Inc. a device easily accessible and visible to any 
person to bring to the knowledge of illegal content falling 
within the scope of defending crimes against humanity 
and incitement to racial hatred’.
The judge agreed with the demands of the plaintiffs 
and ordered ‘the company Twitter Inc. to communicate 
with the five associations because the data in its 
possession is likely to enable the identification of 
any person who has contributed to the creation of 
clearly illegal tweets with URLs that include the device 
assignment of 29 November in 2012, made inaccessible 
on notification of 23 October 2012’; moreover, the judge 
added ‘that communication must take place within fifteen 
days of service of this decision, and under penalty of 
€1,000 per day of delay after such period’. Secondly, the 
judge ordered ‘the company Twitter Inc. to implement 
in the context of the French service platform Twitter 
Inc. a device that is easily accessible and visible to any 
person to bring knowledge of illegal content, including 
falling within the scope of the apology of crimes against 
humanity and incitement to racial hatred’.
To come to this decision, the first question for the 
judge was to determine if she was competent; and 
following it, the main questions were to qualify Twitter 
Inc. and Twitter France, their connexion with France and 
its territory, and the applicable law.
On the competence of the French judge, the litigious 
tweets had been received in France, because Twitter 
can be viewed everywhere in the world. Consequently, 
damage occurred on the French territory and so the 
French judge was competent.7 In addition, it should be 
noted that it is specified in the case that Twitter did not 
dispute the jurisdiction of the French judge or the illegality 
of the tweets. The French judge was competent to deal 
with this case.
The judge examined the two demands separately. 
Firstly, the judge investigated the demand from the 
associations that Twitter should enable the identification 
of the authors of the tweets by transmitting the 
identification data it possessed.
According to the associations, Twitter and its French 
branch, Twitter France, should be seen as a provider 
with a sufficient connexion with France, notably due to 
the existence of Twitter France, making the French law 
applicable. The defendant argued that Twitter France 
was created only for a commercial purpose, notably 
marketing, and all the data are collected and stored only 
by Twitter in the United States, and so it cannot be seen 
as a provider under the French law, which meant that the 
French law was inapplicable.
To answer this demand, the judge started by deciding 
if the act of 21 June 2004 on confidence in the digital 
economy (LCEN) and its qualification of provider were 
applicable to Twitter and to the case. LCEN does not 
specify its spatial applicability, but the provision of article 
4 of its Implementing Decree No. 2011-219 of 25 February 
20118 provides that
‘La conservation des données mentionnées à l’article 
1er est soumise aux prescriptions de la loi du 6 janvier 
1978 susvisée, notamment les prescriptions prévues à 
l’article 34, relatives à la sécurité des informations.’
‘The retention of data referred to in article 1 shall be 
subject to the requirements of the law of 6 January 
1978 referred to above, including the requirements set 
out in article 34, for information security.’
Article 2 of Law No. 78-12 of 6 January 19789 relating to 
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computers, files and freedoms accurate treatment are 
subject to this law ‘whose controller is established on 
the French territory’ or ‘uses processing means located 
on French territory.’ The judge followed the arguments 
of the defendant about the commercial purpose of 
Twitter France and that Twitter is incorporated in the 
United States and does not use the French territory 
for its activity; consequently, the judge declared LCEN 
inapplicable to the case.
Some authors find the way that the judge solved 
the conflict of laws not fully convincing.10 Moreover, 
the plaintiffs argued that some articles of LCEN can be 
qualified as statutes relating to public policy and safety 
that would apply to a foreign company such as Twitter, 
and so it would have avoided the necessity to resolve 
the conflict of laws. It should be noted here that the 
notion of statutes relating to public policy and safety is 
controversial. However, as it was a procedure for interim 
relief, the judge did not go further on this question.
Finally, the judge found the solution in the alternative 
demand of the plaintiffs on the basis of article 145 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure,11 which reads:
‘S’il existe un motif légitime de conserver ou d’établir 
avant tout procès la preuve de faits dont pourrait 
dépendre la solution d’un litige, les mesures 
d’instruction légalement admissibles peuvent être 
ordonnées à la demande de tout intéressé, sur requête 
ou en référé.’
‘If there is a legitimate reason to preserve or to 
establish, before any legal process, the evidence of 
the facts upon which the resolution of the dispute 
depends, legally permissible preparatory inquiries may 
be ordered at the request of any interested party, by 
way of a petition or by way of a summary procedure.’
The present action was a procedure for interim relief. 
The judge justified the application of this article with 
three arguments: firstly, the litigious tweets are offences 
under French law and only Twitter could identify the 
persons concerned in order to initiate legal proceedings 
against the authors; secondly, Twitter did not contest the 
wrongful character of the litigious tweets; and thirdly, 
Twitter possessed the data due to its obligation to 
conserve them under Californian law. However, here the 
application depended on the cooperation of Twitter. If 
Twitter is not cooperative, the French judge would have 
to request the execution from a Californian judge, and the 
success of such demand is not certain.
The second demand investigated by the judge was for 
the creation of a method to identify and inform Twitter 
about manifestly illegal content. The main argument by 
the associations was the fact that ‘the form in question 
was not available in the French language in any case 
on the eve of the hearing’, however Twitter produced 
a form on the day of the hearing. The judge followed 
the plaintiffs, and recognised that the form produced 
by Twitter was not sufficiently visible and accessible. 
However, as Twitter agreed on the necessity of such 
form, the judge did not go further and just asked 
Twitter to make the form more visible. Here again, 
the implementation of the decision depended on the 
cooperation of Twitter.
The appeal by Twitter
On 21 March 2013, Twitter decided to appeal the first 
instance decision.12 From the first instance decision, 
Twitter had to comply with two obligations, firstly, to 
communicate data that would enable the identification 
of the authors of the illegal tweets; and secondly, to 
establish a method to identify and inform Twitter about 
manifestly illegal content.
Regarding the obligation to communicate data that 
would enable the identification of the authors of illegal 
tweets, Twitter recognized that it possessed the data, 
but refused to communicate it for two reasons: firstly, 
Twitter justified its decision not to transmit the data 
by the fact that it would be an irreversible act without 
a possible appeal for the users concerned. Secondly, 
Twitter restated, as it did in the first instance hearing, that 
it is committed to provide the data for the identification 
of the authors of tweets exclusively in connection with 
an international rogatory commission respecting the 
provisions of international conventions ratified by 
France and the United States. For the judge of appeal, 
this was not sufficient to justify the refusal of Twitter to 
communicate the data, because Twitter failed to comply 
with the decision that it had appealed against (article 526 
of the Code of Civil Procedure), which meant it could not 
appeal on a point that it failed to comply with.
Regarding the second obligation, the day after the first 
instance judgment, Twitter had implemented a method 
to identify and inform Twitter about manifestly illegal 
content in French. However, l’UEJF, as well as the judge 
of appeal, considered that this new procedure was not 
visible enough for users. The process of identifying illegal 
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content is described in the judgment; the main criticism 
from both the UEJF and the judge was the fact that 
signalling illegal content was not possible from the main 
page, and the user had to pass through the help centre of 
Twitter and obtain access to more pages before signalling 
the illegal content.
As a consequence, the judge of appeal concluded that 
Twitter had not complied with the two obligations arising 
from the first instance decision, and the judge of appeal 
decided to strike out the appeal formed by Twitter. To do 
so, the French judge used the provisions of article 526 of 
the French Code of Civil Procedure, which allows the judge 
to strike out the appeal when the appellant does not 
justify the reason of his failure to execute the appealed 
decision.
Developments related to and following the 
trial
Since the beginning of this case, in addition to its legal 
side, there was a significant political side. Fleur Pellerin, 
the French Minister for the Digital Economy, declared 
that Twitter must conform to the European legal system 
and human rights.13 Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the 
French Minister of Women’s Rights and Government 
spokesperson, published an opinion column in the 
French newspaper Le Monde where she asked Twitter 
to find a way to control users’ publications with racist or 
homophobic content, and warned Twitter against future 
possible legal action in France or in Europe.14 The French 
government organised a meeting with Twitter and the 
associations that respond to racism and homophobia.15 
Following this meeting, on 17 May 2013, Najat Vallaud-
Belkacem announced on her Twitter account that the 
association SOS Homophobie had been granted a specific 
Twitter account, allowing it to signal illegal tweets.16 
Some noted that Twitter seems to have been much more 
receptive and cooperative than other internet companies 
in previous cases, even if some other internet companies 
found a solution with the French associations without 
going to court. 17 Finally, the on 12 July 2013, Twitter 
announced that it would cooperate with the French court 
and provide the required identification data.18 
However, the anonymity and impunity of the users 
of Twitter for the content of their tweets was not only 
criticised in France but also in several other countries. 
Notably in the United Kingdom, where some women in 
the public eye received bomb threats and rape threats on 
their Twitter accounts.19 In the following days, a debate 
occurred in the UK, and more than 127,000 people signed 
a petition calling Twitter to add a ‘report abuse’ button.20 
Finally, on 3 August 2013, Twitter announced on its UK 
blog (http://blog.uk.twitter.com) of a number changes, 
notably the introduction of an ‘in-Tweet report button’; 
this ‘in-Tweet report button’ is already available for 
IOS and ‘[s]tarting next month, this button will also be 
available in our Android app and on Twitter.com.’21 
Conclusion 
The creation of the ‘in-Tweet report button’ was one of the 
demands of the French associations in the Twitter case. It 
can be assumed that, in addition to what happened in the 
UK, the French litigation had probably also contributed 
to raising awareness with Twitter on the necessity of 
including such a button.
As a result, Twitter has now complied with the two 
obligations arising from the French Twitter case.
As will be observed, all the outcome of the case 
depended on the willingness of Twitter to comply; indeed, 
the compliance of Twitter was not the result of a judicial 
decision, but of pressure of public opinion. Consequently, 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013)        197© Pario Communications Limited, 2013
the application of the French law appears to depend on 
the goodwill of the foreign provider, or in case of a legal 
procedure, on the goodwill of the authorities of the host 
country of the company. Moreover, it should be noted 
that the French decision concern only two hashtags: 
#Unbonjuif and #unjuifmort, two others were not 
determined by the judge in the case,22 and so the abusive 
comments relating to other hashtags and their contents 
was left to the goodwill of Twitter. In case of disagreement 
with Twitter, a new trial would be necessary.
© François Delerue, 2013
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